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ABSTRACT: 
Since the 2007-08 crisis, banks in many countries have been facing what seems to be a 
serious “trust crisis”. This sharp decline in trust in banks and banking, the likely outcome 
of the near-collapse of banking systems during the crisis, is partly captured by a growing 
empirical literature. However, this literature presents serious shortcomings, which reflect 
a more general lack of theorization of trust in banks. This lack of theorization certainly 
has much to do with the distance between the economic literature on banks and banking 
and the sociological and economic literature on trust. This paper aims at bridging this gap 
by proposing a new conceptual framework. In particular, the paper identifies three related 
dimensions of trust that seem to have relevance for the banking industry: “relational”, 
“systemic” and “vertical” trust. While mainstream financial intermediation theory and 
agency theory provide a good understanding of relational trust, they are less well 
equipped to deal with the other dimensions of trust. The paper, therefore, builds on 
heterodox theories of money and debt to build a more comprehensive understanding of 
trust in banks. This tentative conceptual framework, in turn, has implications for current 
theories of banking and of trust. 
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“Commercial credit may be defined to be that confidence which subsists 
among commercial men in respect to their mercantile affairs. This 
confidence operates in several ways. It disposes them to lend money to each 
other, to bring themselves under various pecuniary engagements by the 
acceptance and indorsement [sic] of bills, and also to sell and deliver goods 
in consideration of an equivalent promised to be given at a subsequent 
period.” (Thornton, 1802: 75) 
 
“It is commonly supposed that bankers act only as agents or intermediaries 
between persons who want to lend and those who want to borrow. Bankers 
never act as agents between those who want to lend and those who want to 
borrow. Bankers buy money from some persons : and Rights of action from 
others : exclusively with their own Credit.” (MacLeod, 1889: 375) 
 
Introduction 
The 2007-09 global banking crisis has shed light on the peculiar problems of trust 
maintenance and erosion in banking. In the United States, post-crisis public opinion polls 
on “confidence” in banking have shown drastic drops in “trust”1; while in the United 
Kingdom, the long lines that formed outside of Northern Rock branches in the fall of 
2007 seemed to epitomize the disruption of trust generated, presumably, by the crisis2. 
This problem – trusting banks – is not new, however; but perhaps public sensitivity is 
unusually high, which explains how, in the wake of the 2007-08 crisis, more recent 
scandals (such as the Libor-fixing scandal that erupted in 2012) have immediately raised 
the specter of a collapse of trust in banks3. As a matter of fact, in the wake of the crisis 
several economists have identified what they see as a “trust crisis” in banking (Sapienza 
& Zingales, 2012; see also Guiso et al., 2009; Mosch & Prast, 2008; Knell & Stix, 2010). 
In addition, policy-makers and banking regulators seem readily tempted to embrace the 
                                                           
1
 These two terms are used interchangeably by Gallup pollsters / analysts, which of course does not 
contribute to clarify the issue. They are discussed in the next section. 
2
 Section 5 of the present paper discusses the problem of causality in the disruption of trust in banks. 
3
 See, for instance, “Public trust in banks ‘obliterated’ over scandal”, The Independent, July 2d, 2012. 
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rhetoric of trust as a key driver for regulatory oversight, as recent public remarks by the 
then Bank of England governor-designate indicate4.  
Trust, indeed, matters a great deal in the banking industry. One could argue, with Henry 
Thornton, that confidence is the real business of bankers (Thornton, 1802). Confidence 
(which we will equate for now with trust) is both a requirement for credit/debt 
transactions to take place – hence the expression “entrusting someone with one’s money” 
– and the main reason why honesty is a key requirement for bankers5. As the future Bank 
of England governor argued in his February 2013 speech, restoring trust in banks is 
predicated upon ensuring higher integrity on the bankers’ part. This view certainly 
resonates with a widespread indictment of bankers’ “greed” as one of the main culprits of 
the crisis. 
However, either due to its “taken-for-granted” nature or to the perceived elusiveness of 
the notion, trust has not often been studied in relation to banks. As mentioned above, in 
the wake of the 2007-08, a small but growing economic literature has tackled the issue. 
Yet, this literature, reviewed in the second section of this paper, presents serious 
weaknesses. In particular, it bases its findings on very crude or under-theorized notions of 
trust. 
Trust, of course, has given rise to a prolific literature in various disciplines (psychology, 
sociology, political science, economics…). A general theoretical discussion of this 
concept does not fall within the scope of this paper. Rather, the present study aims at 
building on this vast and pluri-disciplinary literature to propose a framework for 
understanding and assessing trust in banks.  
                                                           
4
 See “Carney warns of lack of confidence in banks”, The Financial Times, February 25, 2013. 
5
 For instance, under current regulations the United Kingdom’s banking regulatory body, the Prudential 
Regulatory Authority, assesses the “fitness” and “property” of the future managers of the banks whose 
creation it authorizes. This “approved persons” regime is similar to that in place in many other countries 
following the shift from structural to prudential regulation of banks in the past decades. 
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The paper is organized as follows: section 1 briefly discusses the peculiar importance of 
trust in banking; section 2 reviews the empirical literature on trust in banks and discusses 
its methodological shortcomings; section 3, drawing on the general literature on trust in 
economics and sociology, discusses the theoretical problems raised by the empirical 
literature. Sections 4, 5 and 6 present the conceptual framework, by highlighting its three 
dimensions, called here “relational trust” (section 4), “systemic trust” (section 5) and 
“vertical trust” (section 6). Conclusions follow. 
1. Banks as “guardians of trust” 
In her seminal work on the institutional bases of trust formation in the XIXth century 
United States, Lynne Zucker argued that the rise of banks in particular and of the services 
industry in general corresponded to a shift from interpersonal to institutional forms of 
trust. In other words, at a time when the traditional bases for interpersonal trust in US 
society were eroding, trust was restored through the emergence of institutions such as 
banks (Zucker, 1986). A similar argument was made by Shapiro on a synchronic level 
(her analysis is not historical): when interpersonal trust does not work, impersonal trust 
can be exercised by “guardians of trust”, “a supporting social-control framework of 
procedural norms, organizational forms and social-control specialists, which 
institutionalize distrust” (Shapiro, 1987: 635). 
Banks are especially well suited to be “guardians of trust”. As a matter of fact, the 
contemporary literature on banking justifies the existence of banks in the very situations 
where trust matters: in the context of future, risky investment (financial contracts) where 
uncertainties are high and the possibility of opportunistic behavior exists. These 
characteristics correspond to the existence of information asymmetries. Indeed, as Boot 
put it, the theory of information asymmetries helps distinguish “modern theories of 
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financial intermediation from the earlier transaction costs-based theories” (Boot, 2000: 8), 
while Bhattacharya & Thakor argue, reflecting widely shared views among economists, 
that “intermediation is a response to the inability of market-mediated mechanisms to 
efficiently resolve informational problems” inherent to financial transactions 
(Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993: 14).  
The specificity of banks, in other words, lies in the type of contractual mechanism used to 
solve informational asymmetries. Modern theories, in particular, insist on banks’ 
“informational advantages” (with respect to markets) in reducing credit rationing (Stiglitz 
& Weiss, 1983); acting as delegated monitors, and therefore reducing the cost of 
monitoring borrowers sustained by lenders/depositors (Diamond, 1984); and undertaking 
relationship lending, which also helps decrease information asymmetries and conjure both 
adverse selection and moral hazard (Boot, 2000; Petersen & Rajan, 1994). 
Relationship lending, in particular, epitomizes the survival of relational elements within 
an institutionalized production of trust: In her study of XIXth century capitalism in the 
US, Zucker notes that “while the economy as a whole became increasingly national, 
banking became increasingly local” (Zucker, 1986:61). Relationship lending is also 
typical of the specificity of institutionally produced trust, as opposed to interpersonal 
trust. This is why it differs from the “re-embedding” strategies envisioned by Shapiro as 
the possible responses to opportunism. Re-embedding consists in limiting principals’ 
relationships to “known agents” (Shapiro, 1987). Relationship lending, by contrast, 
consists in creating long-term relationships with agents so that information asymmetries 
are reduced.  
Viewed in a longer historical perspective, contemporary theories of banking, by 
emphasizing the importance of information asymmetries in explaining the emergence of 
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banks, implicitly compute a return back to the origins of modern banking theory when, 
during the early XIXth century, economists / practitioners such as Henry Thornton wrote 
of credit as confidence, as the quote above illustrates. Then, as now, trust was seen as a 
crucial component of banks’ business. No wonder, therefore, that the measurement of 
trust in banks has become the object of study of a burgeoning literature. 
2. Measuring trust in banks: pitfalls of the empirical literature 
This growing body of works is mostly empirical and – particularly since the 2007-08 
crisis – focuses on identifying signs of a decline in trust. Most of the measures of trust 
used in this literature are measures of public opinion and perceptions – usually collected 
from other sources. Guiso et al., for instance, rely on the “Eurobarometer Surveys” 
(Guiso et al., 2009); while Knell & Stix draw on quarterly surveys produced by the 
Austrian National Bank to measure trust in banks (Knell & Stix, 2010). In the wake of the 
2007-08 crisis, two US economists, Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales, have set up their 
own public trust index: called the “Chicago Booth/Kellogg School Financial Trust 
Index”, its mission is, according to their website, “to monitor the level of trust Americans 
have in banks, the stock market, mutual funds, and large corporations, and to regularly 
assess how current events, policy and government intervention might affect this trust”6. 
Data is gathered by a specialized firm through quarterly surveys of opinions of a “sample 
of 1,000 Americans”7. 
Unsurprisingly, analysis based on these measures of trust seems to indicate that trust 
levels are very much influenced by “subjective” characteristics (see Knell & Stix, 2010; 
Guiso et al., 2009). In addition, bank staff’s “emotional intelligence” can be associated 
                                                           
6
 See http://www.financialtrustindex.org/about.htm. Last access: January 15th, 2014 
7
 Ibid. 
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with a bank’s customers levels of trust (Hefferman et al., 2008). The same conclusion is 
reached by Gallup pollsters (Wood & Berg, 2011).  
However, these indications are of limited use, given the methodological flaws these 
surveys suffer from. Their main weakness is the univocal characterization of trust; the 
most extreme example coming from Gallup poll questions (“do you have trust in 
banks?”). If, in other words, trust is understood as a general inclination or disposition, it is 
no wonder that “subjective” values influence trust. The same flaw characterizes general 
studies of trust that rely on similar measurement methodologies (Glaeser et ak., 2000; 
Guiso et al., 2003; Wang & Gordon, 2011).  
Moreover, and more problematically, these works implicitly rely on disputable theoretical 
assumptions, in particular on the exclusive understanding of trust as a property of either 
bank customers’ outlook or banks’ capacity to be trustworthy. As the Gallup pollsters put 
it in a recent note, “trust is more about what a bank is rather than what it offers” (Wood & 
Berg, 2011). More fundamentally, trust can be measured that way when it is defined in 
purely cognitive (or “intentional”, as Wang & Gordon, 2011, put it) terms; but then it 
becomes difficult to understand how trust can have any effect at all. Trust is merely an 
output (of certain social or transaction-specific mechanisms) that can be beneficial in a 
general sense. 
3. From measures of trust to a theory of trust 
This is where the existing empirical literature on trust in banks suffers from a deeper lack 
of awareness of (and engagement with) decades of theoretical and empirical work on trust 
done mostly but not exclusively by sociologists. In particular, despites continuing debates 
in the (sociological) theoretical literature on trust, three notions seem to be widely shared 
– all three at odds with the narrow view of trust implicitly conveyed by the empirical 
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literature cited above. The three notions are that (i) trust is behavioral as much as it is 
cognitive; (ii) trust is a social phenomenon; (iii) trust is not the property of individual 
transactions / relationships. 
Trust: cognitive AND behavioral 
From some economists’ point of view, the possibility for a transaction to take place (i.e. 
the whole basis of a market economy) depends on the exchange partners’ decision to 
“cooperate” (in a broad sense, that is: exchange goods, services and money); in turn, this 
decision to cooperate will depend on agents’ expectations about their partner’s future 
behavior; in other words, trust (Arrow, 1974). In the particular case of banks, depositors 
entrust banks with their money. Trust is cognitive, and expectations are a key component 
of trust besides risk and cooperation. Many theorists explicitly acknowledge this; for 
instance, Zucker defined trust as “a set of expectations shared by all those involved in an 
exchange” (Zucker, 1986: 2). Similarly, according to Möllering trust should be seen as a 
“state of favourable expectation regarding other people’s actions and intentions” 
(Möllering, 2001: 404). 
Expectations are also especially relevant for a theory of trust in banks, since banks 
operate in a world of imperfect information (and, as pointed out above, banks may be 
viewed as devices reducing, but not eliminating, information asymmetries). Luhmann 
wrote of extrapolated information (“überzogene Information”) in the sense that trust 
implies acting on the basis of limited information and consciously ignoring missing 
information (Luhmann, 1968). This aspect strongly resonates with the old and 
contemporary theories of banking evoked above. 
However, trust is not just cognitive. One should not confuse reasons for trusting with 
causes of trust (Nooteboom, 2006). Georg Simmel has been credited for being among the 
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first authors to have identified the disconnect between information and action - this 
“mysterious” element that connects interpretations and expectations (Möllering, 2001). 
Möllering further insisted on the Simmelian notion of a “leap of faith” as the missing link 
between information, expectations and action. Similarly, one may add, Luhmann saw 
trust as a “leap into a limited and structured form of uncertainty” (Luhmann, 1968); and 
Lewis and Weigert emphasized the “cognitive leap” (Lewis & Weigert, 1985) at the root 
of trust. 
Yet, as Möllering argues, even if some influential works on trust seem to follow Simmel’s 
twofold argument (to trust, one has to have good reasons; and from them perform a leap 
of faith to reach a favourable state of expectations), they focus much more on the 
hermeneutic side of trust, emphasizing the reasons why people should trust each other 
(Möllering, 2001). For instance, in a series of influential works, Russell Hardin and 
colleagues put forward a view of trust as “reflected trustworthiness”, i.e. as belief about 
the trustworthiness or untrustworthiness of people or institutions (Hardin, 2002 & 2004; 
Cook et al., 2005). Other scholars have explicitly chosen a purely cognitive definition of 
trust. Wang and Gordon, for example, define trust as an “intention”, i.e. the “willingness 
from one party to expect another party (parties) to act competently and dutifully ‘in a 
risky course of action’” (Wang & Gordon, 2011: 584). This “willingness to expect” 
sounds as an incomplete understanding of the “cognitive leap” mentioned above, which 
consists in a decision to trust on the basis of expectations consciously founded on 
incomplete information.  
By contrast, the view adopted here, following Möllering and others, is that trust is 
behavioural as much as it is cognitive. As Luhmann put it quite effectively, when trustful 
expectations (“vertraurensvolle Erwartung”) are not decisive in a decision, we are not in 
presence of trust, merely hope (Luhmann, 1968). Similarly, according to Piotr Szompka, 
11 
 
“the full expression of trust is not only my belief that a certain woman will be faithful, 
helpful, loyal, and so on, but the fact that I marry her” (Szompka, 2006: 909). From an 
apparently opposite point of view, Watson criticizes the shift in meaning undergone by 
the notion of trust as treated by Garfinkel in his 1963 article – from a “tacit and necessary 
precondition” to a set of “attitudes” (Watson, 2009), thus losing the sense of its 
connection to constitutive practices. Actually, the behavioral approach adopted here is 
paradoxically closer to the Garfinkelian notion of tacit understanding than it is to theories 
of trust as a disposition – precisely because it holds together the two ends of the 
“mystery” of trust as identified by Simmel. 
Trust as a social phenomenon 
One important detail in Zucker’s definition, given above, is the word “shared”. Indeed, 
the fact that for trust to exist expectations have to be shared is crucial in Zucker’s analysis 
– and in many other’s. In Garfinkel’s view, summarized by Watson, trust is a 
“background condition for mutually intelligible action” (Watson, 2009). This mutual 
intelligibility, perhaps more than the exchanges to which trust leads, is the true foundation 
of the social nature of trust. In other words, trust is a “social reality” (Lewis & Weigert, 
1985) not so much because of the social nature of its realization (cooperation) than 
because of the shared expectations that gave rise to it. 
Trust as a process ? 
A logical consequence of the acknowledgement of trust as a social phenomenon is to 
reject views of trust as a property of single transactions/interactions. The sharing of 
expectations involves, indeed, more than the two parties to an economic transaction. In 
the case of bank-depositor relationships, for instance, the depositor’s trust in his/her bank 
never only relies on past or present interactions with the bank’s staff ; it always implies, 
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to a certain degree, expectations about the behavior of third parties, especially in a context 
of high uncertainty – be they other depositors, in the case of a bank run; or the lender of 
last resort. One could, at this point, adhere to the view of trust as a “process”, proposed by 
Nooteboom (Nooteboom, 2006). This view also works in favour of the conceptualization 
of trust in behavioural terms, as something that may be produced. Again, this view does 
not fit the implicit assumptions belying the empirical literature on trust in banks cited 
above. 
For all its merits, however, the sociological literature on trust does not, as it is, offer a 
consistent conceptual framework for thinking about trust in banks. Banks and banking, it 
is assumed here, are very peculiar types of economic organization and activity. Therefore, 
an appropriate conceptual framework should mirror this specificity. As a matter of fact, as 
will appear in the last section, thinking about trust in banks might yield useful insights for 
the general literature on trust.  
The following sections propose thus a tentative conceptual framework, in line with the 
view of trust as a multilevel phenomenon, endorsed by several authors  (Wang & Gordon, 
2011; Curral and Inkpen, 2006). In particular, the various dimensions of trust identified in 
the next sections are seen as inter-dependent and “co-evolving”, in line with the 
arguments set forth by Curral and Inkpen (2006). 
4. “Relational” trust in banks 
As seen in previous sections, contemporary banking theory converges with the analyses 
of Zucker and Shapiro to consider banks as financial intermediaries specialized in 
reducing information asymmetries – or in producing trust. Others are less optimistic. For 
instance, according to Chamley et al., the 2007-08 global banking crisis “exposed ‘trust 
me banking’ for what it is – a system that no one can really trust because no one external 
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to the banks can verify what the banks really hold and no one external can have access to 
this information because of the claim that it is proprietary” (Chamley et al., 2012: 3). 
This general claim about the banking industry yields an important insight for the first 
level of enquiry into the specific issue of trust in banks, proposed in the present paper. 
The relationship between a bank and its depositors (for instance) can be conceived as an 
agency relationship. We find ourselves in the same situation envisioned by Shapiro when 
she asks, who can trust the guardians of trust? Indeed, while the existence of banks can be 
justified on the grounds of a reduction in information asymmetries, banks generate 
information asymmetries of their own. And, as Shapiro points out, agency relationships 
proliferate especially in situations where principals have little access to information / little 
capacity to process and analyze that information (Shapiro, 1987). 
In this context, given the complexity of banks’ businesses, and the multiplicity of a 
bank’s stakeholders (owners, managers, depositors, borrowers), trust can be seen as the 
outcome of a multifold strategic interaction. The question then becomes whether 
individual banks and/or organizational forms are more or less successful at reducing 
agency costs (i.e. fostering trust). Here again, agency or contractual views of trust 
strongly resonate with mainstream theories of banking. If these theories draw on 
information asymmetries to explain the existence of banks (as opposed to financial 
markets), there is a second tier of theories that aim to explain the impact of differences in 
banks’ organizational forms in banks’ abilities to minimize agency costs. In other words, 
banks elicit different degrees of trust on the basis of their governance characteristics – or 
agency arrangements, which, according to Shapiro, “serve as a temporal conduit, 
connecting relevant past events and future contingencies with present resources” 
(Shapiro, 1987: 628).   
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One may call “relational” trust this particular dimension of trust, whereby principals may 
choose between a variety of agents on the basis of agents’ capacity to lower agency costs 
(that is, they offer less opportunities to exploit information asymmetries to their 
advantage). Relational trust is mostly synchronic and produced by specific governance 
arrangements. Relational trust can differ across transactions; and different organizations 
(the agents) may elicit different degrees of trust from their customers (the principals). In 
the case of banking, then, relational trust may vary from one banking organization to the 
next for reasons that have to do with the governance arrangements associated with 
different types of banks. 
However, trust in banks cannot be reduced to this relational dimension, for at least three 
reasons. First, an agency-based view of trust misconstrues the latter as a set of 
dispositions / attitudes attached to one or both exchange partner(s), thus overlooking the 
relational and process nature of trust, which, as argued previously, should instead be 
central in our understanding of trust. Secondly, there is no reason why contractual 
obligations and governance arrangements should be the only bases of trust. Zucker has 
shown how trust can be produced by contracts (Zucker, 1986); similarly, Bradach & 
Eccles have argued that trust, price and authority are not mutually exclusive mechanisms, 
but can be combined within and across firms (Bradach & Eccles, 1989). Within this 
perspective, trust may arise out of norms of obligation and cooperation: norms of fairness, 
for instance; or norms transferring obligations from one realm to the other.  
Third, and perhaps more importantly, the reduction of trust to its relational dimension 
would imply accepting the notion that trust may emerge in and characterize single, 
bilateral interactions separate from each other. Zucker criticized such transaction-based 
views of trust that consider only separate transactions. While trust may indeed arise out 
of separate transactions in various industries, it is certainly not the case in banking. 
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Banking transactions, be they debit or credit transactions are not separate from one 
another: each transaction between a bank and its customers is really a transaction between 
banks. In addition, banks are creators of money – each banking transaction has a money 
creation side that implies the acceptance of money as universal equivalent. In other 
words, a single banking transaction implies the very social acceptance of an economy-
wide unit of account. For these two reasons, the nature of banking lends itself, better than 
any other industry, to the social dimension of trust discussed in section 3 – what we call, 
in the next section, systemic trust.  
A related weakness of the relational reduction of trust lies in the issue of infinite 
regressions: as Shapiro argued, the more the control provided by impersonal trust 
mechanisms, the more the opportunities of abuse of trust, thus creating an “inflationary 
spiral of escalating trust relationships” (Shapiro, 1987: 652). Governance arrangements, 
therefore, which are the key determinants of “relational” trust, do not put an end to the 
process of trust; and any understanding of trust must go beyond them. 
For all these reasons, trust in banks does include, but is not limited to, a relational 
component linked to governance arrangement. As is argued in the next section, 
observation of banks and the banking industry actually sheds light on another key 
component of trust, which fully reveals its nature as a “total social fact”. 
5. Systemic trust in banks 
a. Bank runs 
The long lines that formed outside of Northern Rock branches in September 2007 were 
undeniably the sign of a disruption of trust; however, as Shin has argued, it was the 
bank’s failure that caused a bank run rather than the other way round (Shin, 2009). One 
may add that the bank’s failure, provoked by the collapse of its standing on wholesale 
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money markets, is a modern version of a bank run whereby those who run first are not 
retail customers, but wholesale money lenders. The specific case of Northern Rock 
notwithstanding, bank runs represent episodes of disruption of trust in banks that reveal 
the systemic nature of trust in banking. Bank runs have been frequent during the 2007-08 
crisis. One could mention depositors’ run on Washington Mutual, for instance, among the 
largest in recent US history (see Grind, 2012). Bank runs are also useful for our purpose 
in that they fit the second indirect way to measure trust indicated by Zucker – i.e. 
assessing group reactions to disruption of trust (Zucker, 1986). More importantly yet, 
bank runs shed light on a component of trust that is not transaction-specific or, as argued 
before, relational. 
One characteristic of retail banking is the guarantee to get one’s money back on demand. 
This “gives each creditor more assurance of recovery if she sees smoke before other 
creditors see fire, but less assurance of getting paid back if all creditors see smoke at once 
and simultaneously rush to withdraw” (Chamley et al., 2012: 2). There is a collective 
action problem that has to do with trust – but a kind of trust not captured by the relational 
view exposed above. Bank runs do not manifest the irrational exuberance of banks’ 
clients; rather, they show agents’ rational expectations about the way banking works. In 
other words, it would be mistaken to see bank runs with the exclusive lenses of social 
psychology - as the manifestations of collective irrational behavior verging on panic. 
Indeed, while irrationality might and often does play a role in the process of the 
disruption of trust, the potential for bank runs is inherent to the very nature of trust in 
banks. 
In fact, the literature on bank runs explicitly distinguishes cases of panic from 
“information-based bank runs” (Jacklin & Battacharya, 1988). Again, while the process 
of the disruption of trust within bank runs might evolve along socio-psychological lines 
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far away from economic rationality, which lead several authors to focus on the 
mechanisms of contagion (see, for instance, Saunders & Wilson, 1996, and Iyer & Puri, 
2008), the main reason for the disruption of trust in banks as expressed in a bank run has 
to do with the depositors’ expectations about how the bank may fare in the immediate 
future. These expectations are “reflexive”, in that they are expectations about other 
agents’ expectations. Most works in the literature on bank runs share this view, even if 
some emphasize information asymmetries among depositors, arguing that bank runs 
occur on the basis of information accessed by certain groups of depositors – information 
showing that the bank’s health is deteriorating (Jacklin & Bhattacharya, 1988; Chen, 
1999). Several authors have treated information asymmetries as secondary, focusing 
instead on coordination problems among depositors (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983; 
Postlewaite & Vives, 1987; Goldstein & Pauzner, 2005; Rochet & Vives, 2004).  
In this case, by contrast with the cases envisioned by Zucker, the extension of disruption 
of trust across transactions does not imply an “attribution of intentionality” (Zucker, 
1986: 10). Rather, bank runs occur as an endogenous process of trust disruption, by 
opposition to exogenous factors (i.e. factors exogenous to the nature of economic 
exchanges) emphasized by Zucker (1986). Again, this does not mean that no exogenous 
factor may play a role in a bank run: that would be a ludicrous claim, given the 
importance changes in external conditions have had in provoking bank runs in many 
instances (such as in the case of the bank runs on Washington Mutual, which were clearly 
spurred by growing uneasiness, among depositors, around the extent of the bank’s 
exposure to subprime mortgage lending at a time where mortgage markets were 
collapsing; see Grind, 2012). What is meant here is that the specific case of disruption of 
trust embodied in bank runs might occur precisely because trust in banks is not simply 
relational; it is, equally, systemic. 
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b. Systemic trust as reflexive and reliant on shared expectations 
Systemic trust, i.e. the second dimension of trust in banks and banking, has four key 
characteristics: (i) it characterizes the whole banking system, rather than individual banks; 
(ii) it is reflexive; (iii) it relies on shared expectations; (iv) it emerges along chained 
transactions/interactions. The reflexivity of trust was noted by Luhmann who called this 
characteristic “trusting trust” (Luhmann, 1968); similarly, in the words of Bradach & 
Eccles, trust “possesses a self-fulfilling quality: the existence of trust gives one reason to 
trust” (Bradach & Eccles, 1989: 107). In his discussion of “trusting trust”, Luhmann also 
recalls Parsons’ observation about money: “the rational ground for confidence in money 
is that others have confidence in money”. The self-fulfilling dimension of trust in banks 
has, it seems, a strong connection to the nature of confidence in money. This connection 
consists in two elements: (i) the nature of money as a form of debt (or credit); and (ii) the 
fundamental role played by confidence in the functioning (the stability) of both the 
monetary and the banking system.  
Confidence is consistently overlooked in mainstream monetary theory: it emerges (or not) 
after money has been issued; it is not constitutive of what money is – essentially, a means 
of payment exogenous to the world of exchange. By contrast, in heterodox economic 
theories, confidence is central to the functioning of the monetary system precisely 
because money is endogenous; and money is endogenous in part because it is created by 
(private) banks. This was the point made by “traditional” Keynesians in the 1960s (see 
Tobin, 1963) and Post Keynesians later (see Minsky, 1986). 
However, a perhaps more useful analysis of the mechanism of monetary confidence (and 
therefore systemic trust in banks) is provided by another brand of heterodox monetary 
theories, namely the “mimetic” approach put forth by French regulationists Aglietta and 
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Orléan in a series of works (Aglietta & Orléan, 1982, 1998 & 2002), building, in part, on 
Georg Simmel’s theory of money. While banks are viewed here as “guardians of trust”, 
money can be seen, following Aglietta and Orléan, as the institutional solution to the 
potential violence unleashed by mimetic desire (Aglietta & Orléan, 1982)8. From this 
point of view, the problem represented by “trust in the guardians of trust” is very similar 
to the one raised by confidence in money. The reflexive nature of confidence and of 
systemic trust implies that individual behavior (e.g. the behavior of bank clients) is 
primarily social in the Weberian sense of the word9 - which, again, reduces the relevance 
of transaction-based views of trust, at least when applied to banking. 
The other two characteristics of systemic trust in banks – shared expectations and chained 
transactions – also characterize confidence in money. Shared expectations lie at the root 
of theories of bank runs based on coordination problems, as argued in the previous 
section; they are also what gives rise to the possibility of money in the first place, 
according to Aglietta and Orléan (2002). Of course, shared expectations are central in 
several theoretical accounts of trust. Zucker, in particular, identifies two kinds of 
expectations that give rise to the possibility of trust: constitutive expectations, which are 
tied to the specific interaction between the trustful principal and the trustworthy agent; 
and background expectations, which commands certain kinds of rule-like behavior in 
various social settings (Zucker, 1986). In the cases of banking and money, these two 
types of expectations are strongly related. 
                                                           
8
 In a nutshell, Aglietta & Orléan, drawing on both René Girard’s literary studies and anthropological works 
on money, argue that the causality posited by neo-classical economists, i.e. that money arose as a means 
to facilitate exchange, should be turned upside down: money is the necessary condition for exchange to 
occur, because exchange partners are not, as assumed by mainstream economists, individuals with 
different preferences seeking to coordinate their behavior; they are, on the contrary, individuals moved 
by the desire for the same object (since, according to Girard, most desires are mimetic) and their rivalry, in 
a world without money, would lead to destructive violence. 
9
 “Action is ‘social’ insofar as its subjective meaning takes account of the behaviour of others and is 
thereby oriented in its course” (Weber, 1978: 4). 
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Finally, as shown in the case of bank runs, banking transactions are not separate – 
therefore, disruption of systemic trust can “cascade” down a chain of transactions or bank 
relationships. Similarly, confidence in money brings about the externality of money as a 
means of payment: the more economic agents will use a particular monetary means of 
payments for their transactions, the more other agents will use it. The “chained 
transaction” characteristic of systemic trust is a logical consequence of its reflexive 
characteristic. 
Systemic trust is circular (or reflexive), which means it is always prone to be disrupted – 
or, in other words, confidence in banking is in permanence susceptible to be shaken, 
because of the working of banking itself. In yet other words, systemic trust is unstable 
and needs an external anchor. Again, this reasoning is similar to that followed by Aglietta 
and Orléan in their works on money. As noted by Orléan, the “relational” forms of trust 
identified with governance mechanisms and agency conflicts do not suffice to explain 
aggregate clients’ behavior. Such behavior is often reduced to a “pure immanent logic” by 
mainstream economic theory (Orléan, 1995); yet, contractual solutions to agency 
problems cannot fully satisfy the economist desirous to establish the absolute immanence 
of economic transactions, precisely because they involve a third party10. Reputation, 
viewed by some economists as a corrective mechanism (Kreps & Wilson, 1982), actually 
suffers from the very same flaws.  
The only way economic exchanges can work, according to Aglietta and Orléan, is 
through the dual process of election and exclusion of money (i.e., its institutionalization) 
as unit of measurement of goods and services’ value (Aglietta & Orléan, 1982; 2002). 
Once money has been identified as the “pure quantitity” against which all goods are 
                                                           
10
 That is why responding to the problems of trust disruption by seeking to avoid trust altogether and 
relying instead on perfect information, as advocated by Chamley et al., is illusory (Chamley et al., 2012). 
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valued, it is accepted. Acceptance of money has two sides, however: it obliges users to 
accept seigneurage; and monetary authorities must ensure that money is legitimate. As a 
result, money users are both accepting and legitimizing money. 
But a fundamental difference between money, as an abstract representation of social 
needs and social wants (a universal equivalent) on the one hand; and banks as 
organizations, on the other hand, lies in the fact that banks cannot be elected/excluded: as 
firms/organizations, they fully participate in the working of the social world. Thus 
banking needs a mechanism that substitute the election/exclusion mechanism in the case 
of money; in other words, trust in banks cannot be complete without a transcendental 
element, which we call here vertical trust. 
6. Vertical trust: the role of authority and history 
a. Uncertainty, risk and trust 
Risk and uncertainty about the future are two key components of trust acknowledged in 
most of the theoretical literature on trust11. According to Luhmann, trust becomes 
necessary in cases of “risky investment” (Luhmann, 1968). On the other hand, as Shapiro 
put it, “only strategies that virtually eliminate agency and uncertainty are functional 
substitutes for trust” (Shapiro, 1987: 636). It is because of this uncertainty about the 
future (agent’s behaviour) that there is a risk that the agent will not perform as 
desired/required by the principal – therefore, in order for the transaction to take place, the 
principal will have to trust the agent. Uncertainty lies in future events outside of the 
transaction/interaction; in the future behavior of the agent; and, as noted by several 
authors, it is produced by trusting behavior itself (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Luhmann, 
1968).  
                                                           
11
 Interestingly, some recent works on bank runs have suggested to view the latter not merely as 
coordination problems, but as sudden increases in “uncertainty aversion” (Uhlig, 2010; Epstein, 1999). 
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Uncertainty and risk, however, have been understood in very different ways, which has 
bearing on our analysis of trust - “a theory of trust presupposes a theory of time”, 
Luhmann wrote (Luhmann, 1968). For neo-classical and transaction cost economics alike, 
risk consists in “exposure to probabilistic outcomes” (Williamson, 1993: 466). 
Uncertainty, in other words, can be calculated away. There is, here, no real difference 
between the future and the present; mainstream economists do not have a “theory of 
time”. Some sociologists seem to subscribe to this view too. For instance, Gambetta 
writes that trust lies in “the probability that [someone] will perform an action that is 
beneficial or at least not detrimental to us is high enough for us to consider engaging in 
some form of cooperation with him.” (Gambetta, 1988: 104). For heterodox economists, 
on the other hand, uncertainty is of the “Knightian” type, i.e. not reducible to probabilistic 
risk. As Keynes wrote, future events “can only be forecasted with more or less 
confidence”; significantly (for our present purpose), Keynes called the state of 
“psychological expectations” about future events the “state of long-term expectations” 
(Keynes, 1936 [1973]: 148). Building on Keynes, Minsky gave uncertainty the key role in 
the unstable dynamics at the heart of financial systems (Minsky, 1986). 
Knightian uncertainty also underpins banking and money. As Commons has argued, 
banks, as providers of credit, give a present value to expectations about future income. It 
is this “futurity” that lies, according to Commons, at the heart of debt relationships – 
including money (Commons, 1934). Money, in fact, can be seen as “debt issued primarily 
to transfer purchasing power from the future to the present” (Wray, 1992: 301). The 
importance of “futurity” in banking has been acknowledged by early theorists of banking, 
such as Henry Thornton and Henry MacLeod; but it has been largely downplayed in more 
recent works within the financial intermediation theory, mostly geared towards 
understanding the role played by banks with regard to the reduction in information 
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asymmetries (as shown in section 1 of the present paper). An exception, in this regard, is 
the suggestion by Allen and Gale that one of the key functions of banking is to smooth 
inter-temporal risk (Allen and Gale, 1997). That is, banks are able to accumulate capital 
good times and use it in bad times. As Ayadi et al. point out, “Creating and unlocking 
reserves is a specific technique of risk management” (Ayadi et al., 2010: 108). This 
argument is an extension of the liquidity creation thesis (Diamond and Rajan, 2000), 
according to which access to refinancing at low cost and the ability of banks to enforce 
repayment or liquidate bad loans are key determinants of banks’ ability to create liquidity. 
However, while the liquidity creation thesis is pretty much a synchronic theory of 
banking, Allen and Gale introduce a diachronic element that overcomes the limitations of 
mainstream intermediation theory, and establishes a link with institutionalist or 
“chartalist” theories which placed uncertainty at the heart of their understanding of credit 
and money. 
Yet this does not help us to make significant progress in our understanding of trust in 
banks. Banks, indeed, help reduce uncertainty about the future by giving a present value 
to expectations about future income and therefore providing a sounder basis for trust in 
commercial transactions. But this brings us back to one of the problems identified earlier 
by Zucker and Shapiro, and discussed in the first sections of the present paper: if, indeed, 
banks produce trust by reducing uncertainty, what does that tell us about trusting banks 
themselves? How can we trust the guardians of trust? 
b. From hierarchical confidence to vertical trust 
 
The discussion in section 5 has established that trust in money (and in banks) “is not an 
inter-individual relationship, but the relationship of each private agent with society as a 
whole” (Aglietta & Orléan, 2002: 104). Systemic trust (or confidence) is a key element of 
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the “institutionalist” or “chartalist” theories of money on which Aglietta and Orléan base 
part of their analysis. As seen above, Aglietta and Orléan have argued that money arises 
out of a dual process of election and exclusion. For money to work (as a third party 
“arbitrating” mimetic rivalry), however, agents need to have confidence in it. Confidence 
is the “unconditional acceptance of money”, according to the same authors; since it is 
both reflexive and unnatural (because not founded on an elusive intrinsic value of 
money), it is fragile; since it is fragile, it needs to be maintained. To be maintained, it 
needs an external anchor. 
This is where monetary authorities play a key role. This crucial anchoring of systemic 
trust produced by regulatory institutions also helps stabilize uncertainty. This is 
something that economists who emphasize the role of trust and at the very same time seek 
to establish a strong negative connection between regulation and trust, even in banking, 
do not seem to understand (see, for instance, Aghion et al., 2010). Aglietta and Orléan 
call this element “hierarchical confidence”, and it is dependent on the authority of the 
State – after all, the history of money shows a close relationship between 
confidence/acceptance and sovereignty (see Aglietta and Orléan, 1998). In addition, 
money is not limited to private transactions: it is used by the State directly when it taxes 
and spends. 
In Aglietta and Orléan’s analysis, however, “hierarchical confidence” is limited. In 
particular, it is “insignificant in front of the unleashing of rivalries triggered by the power 
of money” (Aglietta & Orléan, 2002: 105). Moreover, the power of hierarchical 
confidence is limited by the rise of the individual, which is, as Aglietta and Orléan argue 
along with many others (starting with Norbert Elias), concomitant with the affirmation of 
absolutist states. There is an individual form of confidence, which Aglietta & Orléan call 
“ethical trust”, that bounds sovereignty: “To be legitimate from an ethical point of view, 
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monetary policies must be in conformity to a monetary order, [which subjects monetary 
policy] to the primacy of the maintenance of the value of private contracts over time” 
(Aglietta & Orléan, 2002: 105-106). There is, in another words, a dialectical relationship 
between “hierarchical confidence” and “ethical trust”: none is self-sufficient, both depend 
on the other. This conclusion is in line with Aglietta & Orléan’s theory of (endogenously 
generated) money, whereby it (money) “proceeds from a diffuse and rooted confidence 
that is originally founded in mimetic adhesion” (Aglietta & Orléan, 2002: 102).  
This view pits Aglietta and Orléan against authors linked to Chartalism, such as Georg 
Friedrich Knapp, who insisted, in apparent conflict with the endogenous view exposed 
above, on the state origins of money (and credit): “Money is a creature of law” (Knapp, 
1924: 1). There are two ways Knapp himself reached to that conclusion: first, by 
observing the arbitrary nature of the choice of a means of payments by the prince/the 
State. Secondly, as Knapp pointed out, money is a form of debt; and, since the State plays 
a key role as the final guarantor of debt repayments, it is indeed the ultimate creator of 
money – and as such the main source of confidence in it. The differences of opinion held 
by Aglietta & Orléan, on the one hand, and by Knapp, on the other, have, it seems, a 
double origin. First, while Aglietta and Orléan analyze the genesis of money from a 
purely abstract perspective, Knapp’s analysis is firmly grounded in history; more 
precisely, in legal history, as he himself pointed out (Knapp, 1924). The historical key 
role played by the State in the transformation of debt and money seems actually 
compatible with the view of money as the outcome of mimetic rivalry. Secondly, it seems 
that Knapp and Aglietta and Orléan do not put the same emphasis on private credit as a 
source of money. Of course, Aglietta and Orléan, like most heterodox thinkers, 
acknowledge both the nature of money as debt and the historical role of private credit 
(i.e., banking) in creating money (see, in particular, their 1998 edited volume); but their 
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theoretical model does not leave room for banks; and, furthermore, downplays the 
importance of the State in banking transactions: “the debt-credit private relationship can 
become the vector of capital circulation that is only distantly dependent on monetary 
authorities” (Aglietta & Orléan, 2002: 142). 
By contrast, Knapp recognized early on the role banks play in creating money, 
anticipating to a large extent the crust of Keynesian theories of banking sixty years later, 
while observing that this role leads to a very strong relationship with the State: “if at first 
we entirely disregard its relation to the State (which often comes in later), a bank is a 
private undertaking for profit, which carries on a strictly defined kind of business. But, 
because its activities are at the same time undeniably beneficial to the public, the State, 
with all its restrictions and supervision, takes pains to give them its powerful support.” 
(Knapp, 1924: 129). 
Knapp’s views on banking and the State are echoed in John Commons’ writings, which 
should allow us to better grasp this “hierarchical” component of trust in banks. As 
Commons argued, banks operate in a regime of monetized debt: money creates a new 
regime of impersonal debt relations. Thus it is not socio-demographic change that 
undermines the bases of personal trust (Zucker, 1986), but the formation of modern 
capitalism is consubstantial with impersonal interactions; this gives confidence and/or 
trust an even more central role to play in capitalism. 
Another major insight offered by Commons lies in his argument that commodification (of 
debt) and institutionalization (of money) proceeded hand in hand – they are two 
interrelated phenomena. On the one hand, indeed, what started as metallic money to pay 
tax and private debt eventually “ceased to be a commodity. It became an institution, 
namely, Legal tender, the collective means of paying public and private debts” 
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(Commons, 1934: 392). On the other hand, release from debt meant that the personal 
promise involved with repayment of debt should be abandoned, i.e. that the personal link 
between debtor and creditor should be severed. Until then, indeed, “a promise had been 
considered a duty to fulfil the promise only to the person to whom the promise was made. 
It was a personal matter. […] a promise to marry cannot even yet be sold to a third party. 
It would be slavery, peonage, or concubinage, under the guise of freedom of contract.” 
(Commons, 1934: 393) Instead, the promise to pay legal tender money could be bought 
and sold. This was, in Commons’ words, a lawyers’ invention. Indeed, Commons sees the 
emergence of a capitalist system based on monetized debt as the outcome of a process of 
legal transformation that was in part motivated by merchants’ desire to better enforce 
contracts (through the “parol” or “behaviour” contract, which appeared in common law in 
the XVIth century) and improve the negotiability of debt. 
This analysis seems close to the arguments put forward by Knapp. The legal foundations 
of modern capitalism (and the credit system in particular) confer to the State a primary 
role in stabilizing expectations about the future12. In banking, both regulations and the 
existence of a lender of last resort fulfil that role. In modern economic theory Keynesians 
have, again, been forceful in arguing that, while banks are private firms motivated by 
profit (Tobin, 1963; Minsky, 1986), their ability to create money is kept in check by 
central banks since, as Wray put it, “prices do not serve as sufficient check on credit 
demand” (Wray, 1992: 305). In addition, as Minsky pointed out, central banks are the 
ultimate way to satisfy banks’ preference for liquidity.  
In other words, banks’ ability to reduce uncertainty about the future (and create trust) is 
conditioned by a form of “hierarchical confidence” that is the outcome of a long historical 
                                                           
12
 This view also fits Pierre Bourdieu’s observation that the State operates as a principle of legitimate 
representation of the social world; and intervenes in the structure of temporality itself (Bourdieu, 2012). 
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process. We call “vertical trust” this form of confidence; and “synchronic” that form of 
vertical trust created by bank regulations and regulatory institutions. 
 
c. Vertical trust: diachronic elements 
 
The “synchronic” aspect of vertical trust seen above provides an anchor to systemic trust; 
and operates on the banking system as a whole. However, there is a second aspect of 
vertical trust that operates at the level of single banking organizations: we call this 
“diachronic vertical trust”. This form of trust is produced by individual banks’ history. 
Bank-client relations, indeed, are historically embedded; and the varying degrees of 
historical embeddedness of bank-client relationships might determine varying degrees of 
trust in particular banking organizations (types). For instance, the rooting of most 
European cooperative banks in a long, local history might be the reason why clients trust 
them more than joint-stock banks for returning their deposits on demand (see Butzbach 
and von Mettenheim, 2014).  
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has presented a tentative framework to conceptualize trust in banks. Trust in 
banks has three dimensions; it is relational, systemic and vertical. As figure 1 shows, each 
of these three dimensions corresponds to a particular level and a particular basis of trust: 
relational trust is specific and combines cognitive and behavioural elements; systemic 
trust is general (system-wide) and also combines cognitive and behavioural elements. By 
contrast, vertical trust mostly relies on a cognitive basis. As argued above, vertical trust 
has two aspects: a synchronic and a diachronic one. Synchronic vertical trust is general: it 
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closely resembles the mechanisms that lead to the acceptance of money, and is generated 
by the functioning of general, State institutions. Diachronic vertical trust is specific, i.e. it 
is linked to specific organizational forms; it is rooted in the historical depth of bank-client 
relationships. 
More importantly, perhaps, these different dimensions of trust are interrelated, as in 
Curral & Inkpen (2006). “Co-evolution” of trust consists, in banking, in a peculiar 
articulation of its various dimensions: relational trust in banks participates in building 
systemic trust; on the other hand, an erosion of systemic trust also affects relational trust. 
In other words, in a banking crisis bank customers start evaluating the comparative 
performance of their bank with more attention – relational trust is more fragile. Systemic 
trust, for the reasons seen above, is also fragile because of its reflexive nature – it needs a 
transcendent anchor, provided by synchronic vertical trust, i.e. bank regulations and state 
institutions. Finally, diachronic vertical trust is influenced by synchronic vertical trust : if, 
for instance, the banking sector is undergoing fundamental changes in its organization 
and functioning due to regulatory changes, and therefore synchronic trust weakens, bank 
customers will tend to put a premium on the bases for diachronic vertical trust, that is, 
value more an alternative anchor for their expectations, i.e. the historical embeddedness 
of their bank-client relationships. On the other hand, diachronic trust strengthens and 
feeds into relational trust. 
The conceptual framework presented here is sketchy and needs to be fleshed out: in 
particular, there is a need for establishing a better connection between trust theory, as 
presented here, and measures of trust in banks. Finally, despite the peculiarity of banking, 
or perhaps because of it, a better understanding of trust in banks might yield interesting 
observations for more general theories of trust. 
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